The Sys tems The ory is a com plex the ory (yet it is not iden ti cal to re cent the o ries of com plex ity). The in ten tion of this qual i fi ca tion is to dem on strate that the concept of a sys tem is a com plex ba sic con cept of sci en tific think ing. This means that it is de fined in terms of var i ous el e men tary ba sic con cepts brought to gether in its ex pli ca tion. The def i ni tion given by Von Bertalanffy to the con cept of a sys tem em ploys con cep tual el e ments com ing from at least five prom i nent concep tual clus ters. In or der to high light the na ture and in ter re la tions be tween these clus ters this ar ti cle fo cuses upon pe ren nial philo soph i cal is sues which pres ent them selves within the def i ni tion of a sys tem. They are those of sta bil ity and change, the one and the many (unity and mul ti plic ity), the whole and its parts, and the re la tion be tween the ma te rial and the vi tal. An anal y sis of the in ter re lations be tween these clus ters pro vides the ba sis for an as sess ment of the scope and lim i ta tions Von Bertalanffy's con cept of a sys tem.
Introduction
The in vi ta tion to par tic i pate in the Forty-Sixth Meet ing of the In ter na tional So ci ety for the Sys tems Sci ences con tains three sig nif i cant state ments: (i) Sta bil ity and change are fre quently iden ti fied as the two most sig nif i cant (and obvi ously in ter re lated) fea tures of twenty-first cen tury op er a tions, or gani sa tions, com mu ni ties and so ci et ies, and their en vi ron ments. (ii) Sys tems think ing pro motes ho lism as its pri mary in tel lec tual strat egy for han dling com plex ity. (iii) Sys tems think ing has been fas ci nated by the ten sions be tween sta bil ity and change, and has em braced a pro cess phi los o phy in or der to grasp the way sys tems de velop over time. The se ri ous re ac tion of Mod ern Sys tems The ory to all atomistic modes of thought may serve as a start ing-point for our dis cus sion (cf. Strauss, 1999) . Since Democritus in troduced his atomistic phi los o phy of na ture in An cient Greece the term at om ism ac quired both a nar row and a broader sense. In its nar row sense it in di cates the at tempt to explain the ma te rial world in terms of last in di vis i ble ma te rial el e ments ("at oms"). In the broader (on to log i cal) sense it is em ployed to des ig nate dif fer ent forms of plu ral ism, or spe cific ways of un der stand ing re al ity from its sup posed last units, build ing blocks or -in the case of hu man so ci ety -in di vid u als. Since 1825 Saint-Simon and his fol lowers (amongst them Auguste Comte) started to em ploy the term in di vid u al ism to des ignate the gen eral ap proach of so cial phi los o phy dur ing the 18th cen tury. Ac cord ing to this view so ci ety was first bro ken apart into iso lated in di vid u als and only af ter wards it was once again ra tio nally re con structed in terms of the the ory of a so cial con tract. Of course there are also other vari ants of at om ism. Just like the empiricistic leg acy of Locke, Berke ley and Hume pro ceed from the "at oms" of sen sa tion, called per cep tions, log i cal at om ism (a phrase coined by Rus sell in 1920) con sid ers el e men tary prop o sitions to be ba sic and not fur ther analysable -they are the log i cal at oms of the world.
Since all views of re al ity pro ceed ing from such (sup pos edly) ba sic (or: ul ti mate) el ements, how ever much they are con sid ered to be in in ter ac tion, even tu ally are faced with the pres ence of gen u ine wholes or to tal i ties, so-called meth od olog i cal in di vid u alism at tempts to side-step their re al ity me thod i cally. Mod ern Sys tems The ory, how ever, was not sat is fied with this move and chose to take as its start ing-point wholes or gen uine to tal i ties. The fear of some "static" ap proach in ad di tion added a fur ther qual i fi cation: sys tems deal with dy namic re al i ties. The com bi na tion of whole ness and dy namic changes ex plains the em pha sis on the in ter de pen dence be tween the dif fer ent parts of a sys tem as a whole.
In their mu tual in ter re la tion ships these parts dy nam i cally con sti tute the whole. One of the key-concepts of all prom i nent vari ants of sys tems the ory is there fore given in the re la tion ship of the con cept of a whole with its parts -ir re spec tive of the way in which the in ter ac tion be tween these parts are con ceived of, or con cern ing how the inter ac tion be tween the whole and its (ex ter nal) en vi ron ment is envisaged.
Thus far we have high lighted dif fer ent con cep tual clus ters. The first one re lates to the fact that we deal with a united mul ti plic ity. Sec ondly, we dis cern the idea of a whole with it parts. Thirdly, prom i nence is given to the idea of sta bil ity (the rel a tive con stancy of an en dur ing or per sis tent whole/sys tem) and fourthly, the idea of dynamic in ter ac tion sur faces -which re fers to the known in ter ac tions of the world we live in. Finally, Von Bertalanffy also adds the di men sion of be ing or gan ised to his circum scrip tion of a sys tem. We now em bark on a closer look at Von Ber talanffy's systems the ory. the liv ing in di vid ual); and we must look for prin ci ples and laws con cern ing "organi sa tion," "whole ness," "or der of parts and pro cesses," "multivariable in terac tion" and so forth, to be elab o rated by a "gen eral sys tem the ory" ( Von Bertalanffy, 1968:40) .
Conceptual clusters involved in the definition of a system
At least five im por tant and un de ni able con cep tual clus ters are there fore re cog nis able in the de scrip tion pro vided by Von Bertalanffy: (i) an ar ith met i cal clus ter: the one and the many; (ii) a spa tial clus ter: mu tu ally con nected parts within a whole or to tal ity; (iii) a ki ne matic clus ter: we shall ar gue be low that it is im plicit in the is sue of sta bil ity and change; (iv) a phys i cal clus ter: dy namic in ter ac tions (ther mo dy namic open sys tems); and (v) a bi otic clus ter: a sys tem is or gan ised (amongst other things it re quires ad ap ta tion to its en vi ron ment). The in ter con nec tions be tween these clus ters will now oc cupy our at ten tion. Be fore we start our anal y sis of the whole-parts re la tion we have to pon der for a mo ment about the very na ture of def i ni tion and con cept-formation.
The nature and limits of definition and concept-formation
In ev ery day par lance as well as in sci en tific dis cus sions and writ ings it seems nat u ral to speak about con cepts. Yet, as soon as one is asked to ex plain what concept-formation en tails, that which ini tially ap pears to be self-evident sud denly turns out to be ex tremely com pli cated. Does the em ploy ment of con cepts fur nish us with a con cept of a con cept?
When we look at the clas si cal leg acy of re flec tion in this re gard, two per spec tives emerge: (a) a con cept is seen as the unity within a mul ti plic ity, and (b) con cept for ma tion is de pend ent on uni ver sal traits. Taken to gether these two per spec tives im ply that the mul ti plic ity which is united re fers to uni ver sal prop er ties en com passed by the con cept. As soon as these im plied el e ments (uni ver sal prop er ties) of a con cept is ex plained (ex pli cated), they have to be des ignated. That is to say, they have to re ceive names, mak ing it pos si ble to un der stand and com mu ni cate them as terms which are con sti tu tive of sen tences and more en com passing texts.
For ex am ple, the con cept of a tri an gle unites the fol low ing prop er ties, des ig nated by ap pro pri ate terms: a flat sur face en closed by three (in ter sect ing) lines (and there fore three an gles). The terms em ployed are: "three," "flat," "sur face," "lines," and "angles." The ques tion is now whether these terms, em ployed in the def i ni tion of a tri angle, can be de fined once more? And if so, what about the terms used to de fine them? Do we en ter on the path of an in fi nite re gress, or do we have to ter mi nate the pro cess at the ba sic level of in de fin able terms?
The lat ter in deed seems to be the case, for as we know the an tique ax i om atic spirit which we have in her ited from the Greeks re ceived its mod ern rig or ous shape in 1899 when Da vid Hilbert, af ter the death of Poincaré in 1912 known as the fore most math ema ti cian of the world, pub lished his Grundlagen der Geometrie (Foun da tions of Geom e try). In this work he ab stracts from the con tents of his ax i oms, based upon three un de fined terms: "point," "lies on," and "line" -all of them re lated to our in tu ition of space, an in tu ition also un der ly ing the re la tion ship be tween a whole and its parts.
The whole-parts relation It seems dif fi cult to de fine the mean ing of con tin u ous ex ten sion. Dantzig did real ise this with an as ton ish ing lu cid ity:
From time im me mo rial the term con tin u ous has been ap plied to space, ..., some thing that is of the same na ture in its small est parts as it is in its en tirety, some thing sin gly con nected, in short some thing con tin u ous! don't you know .... any at tempt to for mu late it in a pre cise def i ni tion in vari ably ends in an im patient: 'Well, you know what I mean!' (1947:167) . Syn onyms like "un in ter rupted," "con nected," "co her ent," and so on, sim ply re peat what is meant with con ti nu ity, instead of de fin ing it! Ar is totle, in fol low ing up cer tain in sights of Anaxagoras, holds it to be self-evident that "ev ery thing con tin u ous is di vis i ble into di vis i ble parts which are in fi nitely di vis ible" (Physica, 231b15 ff.). Al ready the way in which Parmenides char ac ter ised be ing il lu mi nates im por tant fea tures of con ti nu ity and the whole-parts re la tion. The B Fragments 2 and 3 of Parmenides con tained in Diels-Kranz (1959 -1960 says that be ing "... was not and will never be be cause it is con nected in the pres ent as an in di vis i ble whole, uni fied, co her ent" (B Frag ment 8, 3-6).
Mod ern intuitionistic math e mat ics made an ap peal to these in sights of Greek thinking in de vel op ing their al ter na tive to the at om ism en tailed in the thought of Can tor and the for mal ism of Hilbert. Hermann Weyl, for ex am ple, points out that it "... has parts, is a ba sic prop erty of the con tin uum", and adds: "... it be longs to the very es sence of the con tin uum that ev ery one of its parts ad mits a lim it less divisibility " (1921:77) .
Ac cord ing to Weyl, the gen eral aim of Weierstrass, Dedekind and Can tor, namely to ad vance an atomistic per spec tive on space (i.e., to arithmetise spa tial con ti nu ity completely), had to take re course to the neigh bour hood con cept: "To ac count for the contin u ous co her ence of the points, con tem po rary anal y sis, which has sep a rated the contin uum into a set of iso lated points, takes ref uge to the neigh bour hood con cept " (1921:77) .
How ever, it is not at all im per a tive to ad here to the intuitionistic ap proach in mod ern math e mat ics in or der to real ise that the to tal ity-character of con ti nu ity (its "wholeness") is ir re duc ible to nu mer i cal no tions. Paul Bernays, the col lab o ra tor of Da vid Hilbert, states this out come em phat i cally:
The prop erty of be ing a to tal ity un de ni ably be longs to the geo met ric idea of the con tin uum. And it is this char ac ter is tic which re sists a com plete arithme tization of the con tin uum (1976:74) . In an other con text he writes:
We have to con cede that the clas si cal foun da tion of the the ory of real num bers by Can tor and Dedekind does not con sti tute a com plete arithmetization of math e mat ics. It is any way very doubt ful whether a com plete arithmetization of the idea of the con tin uum could be fully jus ti fied. The idea of the con tin uum is af ter all orig i nally a geo met ric idea (Bernays, 1976:187-188) . From the fact that a (con tin u ous) whole is in fi nitely di vis i ble it must be clear that spatial con ti nu ity pre sup poses the mean ing of num ber (a dis crete mul ti plic ity). An other way to phrase this state of af fairs is to say that within the struc ture of space the meaning of num ber is an a log i cally re flected. The mean ing of space there fore co mes to expres sion in its co her ence with other as pects of re al ity.
Whereas the his tory of math e mat ics com pleted the cir cle by start ing with an ini tial arithmetization of math e mat ics, then moved on to an at tempt to ex plore the mean ing of space as ba sic de nom i na tor and fi nally once again re turned to an arithmeticistic concep tion in mod ern set the ory, we may sug gest a third al ter na tive not yet ex plored: accept both the unique ness and mu tual irreducibility of space and num ber.
This brief ar gu ment about the unique ness and irreducibility of num ber and space explains why sys tems the ory is jus ti fied in em ploy ing both nu mer i cal and spa tial terms in its def i ni tion of sys tems.
A sim i lar po si tion ought to be de vel oped with re gard to the pe ren nial prob lem of con stancy (sta bil ity) and change (dy nam ics).
Constancy and Dynamics
The mod ern con cern to over-emphasise the change ful ness of re al ity does not real ise that any form of change only has mean ing on the ba sis of some thing en dur ing. The ease with which we speak about change in vites us to ask: a) Do we need, for ex am ple to be able to speak about a chang ing so ci ety, some thing that is not it self chang ing, i.e. per sis tent and en dur ing? b) Is there any thing con stant ly ing at the ba sis of what ever changes? Early Greek phi los o phy al ready wres tled with the di a lec ti cal op po si tion of con stancy and change. It in spired Heraclitus' fa mous state ment: one can not step into the same river twice, for fresh and ever fresh wa ters are con stantly pour ing into it. Cratylus, a pu pil of Heraclitus, chal lenged Plato with this prob lem of con stancy and change, as can clearly be seen from Plato's di a logue with that name. In this di a logue, Plato had to ac count for the na ture of knowl edge in terms of some thing more fun da men tal than change. He found it in what he termed to be the es sen tial form (auj to; to; ei\ do") of what is known. Al though this ar gu men ta tion gave birth to his spec u la tive the ory of ideas, lo cated in a su per tem po ral do main of ideal be ing, it must be hon oured as the first argued ac knowl edge ment of the un break able foun da tional co her ence be tween con stancy and change.
This in sight en abled Ga li leo to ex plore its nat u ral sci en tific mean ing. He real ised that uni form mo tion (con stant mo tion) is a prim i tive no tion. There fore it is not in need of a phys i cal cause. The phys i cal mean ing of a cause al ways im plies cer tain ef fects, i.e., dy namic changes. What needs a cause is not mo tion, but a change of mo tion (cf. Stafleu, 1980:80) -for in stance ac cel er a tion or de cel er a tion. This im plies that the phoronomic (or: ki ne matic) facet of re al ity is in deed a (foun da tional) con di tion for energy-operation (with its im plied causes and ef fects). Just as con ti nu ity pre sup poses a foun da tional ar ith met i cal mul ti plic ity, phys i cal changes pre sup pose some form of contin u a tion (per sis tence, con stancy), for only on the ba sis of some thing per sis tent is it mean ing ful to iden tify changes. The ba sic in tu ition of con stancy will not be can celed if the ve loc ity of light in a vac uum var ies, be cause es tab lish ing that it changes will then con tinue to pre sup pose the idea of con stancy -it is only on the ba sis of the lat ter that it will be pos si ble to de tect changes. Widening our per spec tive of course will show that mo tion it self pre sup poses space (its path) and num ber (through which its speed is ex pressed). Sim i larly, the phys i cal mean ing of en ergy-operation does not only rest on the (ki ne matic) ba sis of con stancy, since it also (an a log i cally) re flects the founda tion of the spa tial and nu mer i cal as pects (re spec tively in the phys i cal con cepts of vol ume and mass).
If this line or ar gu men ta tion is sound, then it must also be the case that the bi otic mode of or ganic life pre sup poses the as pects of en ergy-operation, ki ne matic mo tion, spa tial ex ten sion and nu mer i cal mul ti plic ity. With out real is ing that the con nec tion between bi otic func tion ing and en ergy is an ex pres sion of the ir re duc ible co her ence between the phys i cal and bi oti cal as pects of re al ity, the age-old leg acy of vi tal ism in the dis ci pline of bi ol ogy stum bled upon this co her ence in its no tion of an "entelechie" (Ar is totle), a "vi tal force."
"Vital force" and "open systems"
The neo-vitalistic bi ol ogy of Hans Driesch ex ten sively ex per i mented with phe nom ena of re gen er a tion. Driesch ac counts for the in ter nal or der and har mony dis played in the func tion ing of liv ing en ti ties by in tro duc ing his no tion of an im ma te rial vi tal force, an entelechie (Driesch, 1920:139 ff.) . This vi tal force is even ca pa ble of "sus pend ing" phys i cal laws, such as the sec ond main law of ther mo dy nam ics (the law of non-decreasing en tropy) (Driesch, 1920:434 ff.) . He en vis aged that this entelechie can ac count for the fact that liv ing en ti ties are ap par ently in deed ca pa ble of in creas ingly build ing up in ter nal or der (that is, ap par ently a de crease of en tropy) in spite of the exis tence of the phys i cal law of non-decreasing en tropy. Driesch co mes to these con clusions af ter hav ing shown con vinc ingly that cer tain parts of liv ing en ti ties, af ter di vision, can func tion as im ma ture wholes ca pa ble of de vel op ing in te gral ma tu rity. In the case of an hy dra, for ex am ple, a part as small as 1/200th can re gen er ate a whole new snake! Yet, when no part is sep a rated from an or gan ism, the orig i nal liv ing en tity will ma ture nor mally with out, by it self, de vel op ing into more than one in di vid ual.
Thus, ac cord ing to Driesch, liv ing en ti ties dis play an in ter nal or der and har mony which keep the "equal po ten tial" of each part in its proper place when the or gan ism is not dis turbed, but when it is di vided at an early stage, each part will ex plore its full regen er a tive po ten tial. Con se quently, Driesch calls a liv ing en tity a "har monic equipotential sys tem" (Driesch, 1920:135 ff.) . No ma chine pos sesses parts that have this ca pa bil ity (1920:132-133, 410, 512) .
The fun da men tal ques tion is sim ply whether or not one needs to sub scribe to the vitalistic no tion of an "entelechie" in or der to ac knowl edge the men tioned re gen er a tive phe nom ena which lead Driesch to his con struc tion? Von Bertalanffy is a case in point, for al though he re jects vi tal ism as a point of ori en ta tion for bi o log i cal thought, he does agree with the ar gu ments raised by vi tal ism against the ma chine model of liv ing en tities. He ac knowl edges that self-repairing ma chines are con ceiv able in terms of the mod ern the ory of au tom ata, but he points out that the "prob lem co mes in with reg u lation and re pair af ter ar bi trary dis tur bances" (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:148) .
How ever, in his his tor i cally sig nif i cant con tri bu tion to mod ern phys ics and bi ol ogy, Von Bertalanffy aban doned this no tion of the "sus pen sion" of phys i cal laws by an imma te rial entelechie, sim ply by pro vid ing a gen er ali sa tion of the sec ond law of ther mody nam ics. The orig i nal for mu la tion of this law of non-decreasing en tropy is only valid for closed phys i cal sys tems.
Al ready in 1824 Car not dis cov ered ir re vers ible pro cesses -a dis cov ery that would even tu ally chal lenge the mech a nis tic main ten dency of clas si cal phys ics which be -lieved that all phys i cal phe nom ena may be re duced to re vers ible pro cesses of mo tion, i.e., to the ki ne matic as pect of reality. By 1850 Clausius and Thomp son, in de pend ently of each other, for mu lated the sec ond main law of ther mo dy nam ics. Clausius in troduced the term en tropy only in 1865. Thomson's for mu la tion of 1852 reads as fol lows: "All the avail able en ergy strive at dis si pa tion, it aims there fore at a uni form dis persion" (cf. Apolin, 1964:440) . [In pass ing we may note that this even tu ally elim i nated the ba sis of the mech a nis tic trend in mod ern phys ics (cf. Planck, 1910:53) . Phys i cal pro cesses are ir re vers ible.]
Von Bertalanffy gen er al ised this law to in clude cases of a con stant in ter change of sys tems with their en vi ron ments:
Chem i cal equi lib ria in closed sys tems are based on re vers ible re ac tions; they are a con se quence of the sec ond prin ci ple of ther mo dy nam ics and are de fined by min i mum free en ergy. In open sys tems, in con trast, the steady state is not revers ible as a whole nor in many in di vid ual re ac tions. Fur ther more, the sec ond prin ci ple ap plies, by def i ni tion, to closed sys tems only and does not de fine the steady state (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:132) . Von Bertalanffy's gen er ali sa tion not only shows that liv ing en ti ties are ther mo dy nam ically open, since in the first place it ac counts for the nu mer ous ex am ples of phys i cal sys tems that are ther mo dy nam i cally open, such as a gla cier or a fire. This dy namic equi lib rium, des ig nated with the term "Fliessgleichgewicht" by Von Bertalanffy (1973:165) , there fore con cerns a phys i cal fea ture of liv ing en ti ties, not a dis tinc tive biotical one! 2 The phys i cist Schrödinger wrote a book about the phys i cal as pect of the cell (cf. Schrödinger, 1955) .
The ap par ent "equi lib rium" pres ent in a liv ing en tity is com pletely dif fer ent from any true equi lib rium in a phys i cal sense. The lat ter state is in ca pa ble of per form ing any work. Von Bertalanffy points out that the dy namic pseudo-equilibrium of liv ing en tities is kept con stant at a cer tain dis tance from true equi lib rium en abling it to per form work while re quir ing con tin u ous im port of en ergy for main tain ing the dis tance from true equi lib rium (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:133) . Schrödinger de scribes this state of affairs by say ing that liv ing things feed on neg a tive en tropy (Schrödinger, 1955:71 ff.) .
As a mat ter of his tor i cal in ter est it is worth not ing that the neo-vitalists who con tinued the leg acy of Driesch in the 20th cen tury in deed made use of Von Bertalanffy's the ory of open sys tems. While fully ac knowl edg ing the na ture of ther mo dy namic open sys tems Schu bert-Soldern, for ex am ple, con tin ues the neo-vitalism of Hans Driesch in the fol low ing re mark able way. To ex plain the (ther mo dy namic) "state of high est improb a bil ity", i.e. in sta bil ity, pres ent in a self-maintaining sys tem, he in tro duces an "insta bil ity fac tor" (Schu bert-Soldern, 1962:62, cf. 68) . Con cern ing the steady flow of build ing ma te rial in a liv ing en tity we are fully jus ti fied in say ing that it is, phys i cally seen, in an un sta ble con di tion. At the same time, how ever -and with out any con tradic tion -we may also say that the same en tity is, seen from a bi oti cal per spec tive, in a sta ble con di tion! When ever phys i cal sta bil ity is ap proached (true equi lib rium), bi otical in sta bil ity is on its way as an in ev i ta ble symp tom of forth com ing bi oti cal death.
This non-contradictory fash ion of grasp ing both the (phys i cal) in sta bil ity and the (bioti cal) sta bil ity of liv ing en ti ties, once more points at the ir re duc ible na ture of the bioti cal as pect of re al ity. Ev i dently, in a purely phys i cal sense it is con tra dic tory to claim that the same en tity can ex ist both in a sta ble and in an un sta ble con di tion! From the per spec tive of his or gan is mic bi ol ogy Von Bertalanffy strik ingly in di cates the cul-de-sacs of the mech a nis tic point of view which elim i nates the bi oti cal func tion of life pro cesses:
These [bio chem i cal -DFMS] pro cesses, it is true, are dif fer ent in a liv ing, sick or dead dog; but the laws of phys ics do not tell a dif fer ence, they are not in terested in whether dogs are alive or dead. This re mains the same even if we take into ac count the lat est re sults of mo lec u lar bi ol ogy. One DNA mol e cule, protein, en zyme or hor monal pro cess is as good as an other; each is de ter mined by phys i cal and chem i cal laws, none is better, health ier or more nor mal than the other (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:146) .
Con cep tual clus ters and ontic do mains
We have iden ti fied five con cep tual clus ters in volved in the def i ni tion of a "sys tem." Im plicitly we have re lated them to the fol low ing ontic do mains: (i) the ar ith met i cal sphere, (ii) the spa tial sphere, (iii) the kinematical sphere, (iv) the phys i cal sphere and (v) the bi oti cal sphere. On the epistemic side each one of these spheres finds its focuse in an in de fin able core in tu ition, and on the ontic level we fol low Dooyeweerd in his des ig na tion of this core mean ing as the mean ing-nucleus of each as pect (guar an tee ing its indefinability, irreducibility and there fore its unique ness). In ad di tion to guar an teeing the irredu cibility of ev ery sphere the mean ing-nucleus of each as pect at the same time qual i fies the links (con nec tions) be tween the dif fer ent as pec tual do mains. An intu ition of unity and mul ti plic ity, whole ness, con stancy amidst change, and that of a dynam i cally or gan ised and liv ing en tity thus co-determines the un der stand ing of a system. Tra di tionally only con cretely ex ist ing en ti ties were con sid ered to be real. However, in the pres ent con text we want to ar gue that not only the con crete what but also the func tional (as pec tual) how par tic i pates in what is ontic.
The ontic basis of conceptual clusters
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At this point, how ever, it must be clear that we con jec ture that the said con cep tual clus ters re flect ontically given spheres, as pects or modes (func tions) of re al ity it self. Al though the the o ret i cal ac knowl edge ment of these spheres/as pects/modes/func tions is the out come of hu man re flec tion, I want to ar gue that these as pects in an ontical sense pre cede hu man cog ni tion and un der stand ing. This po si tion dis tances it self fore most from the nominalistic con vic tion that "that num ber and all uni ver sals are only modes of thought" (cf. Des cartes, Prin ci ples, Part I, LVIII). Con tem po rary de bates about uni ver sals still dis tin guish be tween en tity (sub stance) and prop er ties. Nominalistic and re al is tic op tions con tem plate about phe nom ena such as pred i ca tion, ex act sim i lar ity and ab stract ref er ence. Al though au thors like Wolterstorff, Butchvarov and Loux pre fer to give prom i nence to one of these three phe nom -ena, More land may be cor rect in his as sess ment when he states that he sees "no rea son to choose any as most im por tant" (2001:159 note 15, see page 4).
The fist con cep tual clus ters we have in mind re late to the do mains of mul ti plic ity and ex ten sion (roughly re ferred to as "num ber" and "space"). The state ment quoted from Des cartes sug gests that his nomi nal ism im plic itly as sumes that there is a con tribu tion by the hu man sub ject when uni ver sals are at stake. As "modes of thought" their ex is tence is de pend ent upon think ing. Yet the ques tion re mains whether or not a given mul ti plic ity (for ex am ple of en ti ties) pre cedes the hu man ca pac ity to form a con cept (such as the con cept of num ber)? Prom i nent math e ma ti cians of the 20th cen tury indeed wres tled with this is sue. The co-worker of Da vid Hilbert (known as the lead ing math e ma ti cian of the 20 th cen tury), namely Paul Bernays, ex plic itly ques tions the dom i nant con cep tion that only one kind of factuality ought to be re cog nised, namely that of the "con crete" (Bernays, 1976:122) . Be cause what is called "math e mat i cal objects" are not plainly open to sense per cep tion, the chal lenge is to ac count for the subject mat ter of math e mat ics in terms of non-entitary ontic fea tures. The ex treme pla tonist ought to clar ify this is sue, be cause the as sumed "ob jec tive ex is tence" of "math emat i cal ob jects" is in need of some or other foun da tion if it is not merely (nomi nal is tical ly) pos tu lated as con struc tions of the hu man mind.
Per haps the most strik ing math e ma ti cian to re fer to in this con text is Kurt Gödel, who ac quired in ter dis ci plin ary re pute at the age of 25 when (in 1931) he dem on strated the in her ent in com plete ness of (for mal) ax i om atic sys tems. He in tro duces the idea of "semiperceptions" in or der to ac count for the na ture of "math e mat i cal ob jects". Distinct from a phys i cal causal con text (within which some thing can be "given"), Gödel is con vinced that the data of this sec ond kind "can not be as so ci ated with ac tions of certain things upon our sense or gans" (quoted by Wang, 1988:304) . The math e ma ti cian Wang is "in clined to agree with Gödel," but he does "not know how to elab o rate his as ser tions" (Wang, 1988:304) . Wang says that he feels "that 'an as pect of ob jec tive real ity' can ex ist (and be 'per ceived by semiperceptions') with out its oc cu py ing a lo cation in spacetime in the way phys i cal ob jects do" (Wang, 1988:304) . Surely these con sid er ations call for the ac knowl edge ment of a func tion or an as pect of re al ity which is given in an ontic sense but none the less dif fers from phys i cal (or other kinds of) en ti ties. Un der stand ing the mean ing of these ontically given as pects or func tions in deed re quires a for ma tive (con struc tive) hu man ac tiv ity, in its schol arly sense per formed by math e ma ti cians (and sci en tists from other dis ci plines) who are capa ble, through their ar tic u la tion of math e mat i cal the o ries, to make these given as pectual phe nom ena con cep tu ally un der stand able. In par tic u lar this ap proach will en able us to take a po si tion dif fer ent from both pla ton ism and constructivism. In op po si tion to pla ton ism it ac knowl edges that think ing about the mean ing of num ber and space does not sim ply rest on the ac cep tance of an al ready ex ist ing tran scen dent (ideal) world of "math e mat i cal ob jects" in de pend ent of the think ing hu man mind, since with out the inter fer ence of hu man think ing the ontically given mean ing of quan tity and con ti nu ity can not be dis closed and ar tic u lated in math e mat i cal struc tures. By con trast, it also opposes constructivism in ac knowl edg ing that the sub ject mat ter of math e mat ics is not merely the prod uct of the thought-activities of math e ma ti cians, be cause such ac tiv i ties, in the words of Gödel and Wang, pre sup pose "an as pect of ob jec tive re al ity."
But it is nei ther only the nu mer i cal and spa tial as pects nor merely the kinematical and phys i cal ones that par tic i pate in the ontic sta tus of modal as pects. All other iden tifi able as pects also par tic i pate in this di men sion of re al ity, in clud ing the bi otic as pect.
Living systems
Liv ing sys tems -such as plants, an i mals and hu man be ings -in ad di tion to their concrete func tions within the modes of num ber, space, mo tion and the phys i cal, also function ac tively in the bi oti cal mode of re al ity. In other words, the fact that such en ti ties are alive does not mean that their ex is tence is ex hausted by their bi otic func tion ingman i fested in phe nom ena such as growth, ad ap ta tion, dif fer en ti a tion and in te gra tion, mat u ra tion, age ing and dy ing. Let us briefly ex plain the func tion of liv ing en ti ties in each of the as pects that con sti tute the ontic foun da tion of the bi otic mode.
Von Bertalanffy did real ise, as we have seen, that liv ing things, in a ther mo dy namic sense, are to be con sid ered as open sys tems. More over, this in di cates that ev ery liv ing en tity, in dis tinc tion from its char ac ter is tic bi oti cal as pect, also dis plays a phys i cal aspect (cf. once again Schrödinger, 1955 ). Laszlo con tin ues this per spec tive in his statement: "The rel e vant kinds of sys tems are those that ex ist in a state of dy namic nonequilibrium within an en dur ing en ergy flow. The con di tion of nonequilibrium signi fies the pres ence of en ergy con cen tra tions and chem i cal in gre di ents. This is the precon di tion for the avail abil ity of free, us able en ergy in a dy namic state char ac ter ised by neg a tive en tropy" (Laszlo, 1993:xix) .
Any liv ing en tity also has ac tive (sub ject) func tions in the three as pects of re al ity which are foun da tional to the phys i cal as pect -namely the as pects of num ber, space and move ment. For ex am ple, linked to the ques tion whether or not liv ing things can move by them selves we find an other im por tant dis tinc tion in bi o log i cal sys tem at ics, namely that be tween plants and an i mals. The con ti nu ity (en dur ance) of the life of a plant can not be de ter mined apart from the ki ne matic func tion of liv ing en ti ties. In addi tion to the pro por tions or spa tial form of liv ing things, their spa tial func tion is also prom i nently ex hib ited in ex pres sions like bio-milieu or Umwelt. The term Umwelt gained prom i nence es pe cially ow ing to the bi o log i cal thought of Ja cob von Uexküll (cf. e.g. Von Uexküll & Kriszat, 1970) . Finally, a liv ing en tity is a unity in the di versity (mul ti plic ity) of its or ganic life pro cesses -if these var i ous pro cesses are not bound to gether as a unity, as we have ar gued, the in ner di ver sity of liv ing en ti ties disin te grate and they die.
What we have es tab lished with this brief char ac teri sa tion is that sys tems are in deed co-conditioned (co-determined) by the five fun da men tal modes (func tions) iden ti fied in our anal y sis. Though these modes pri mar ily con di tion sys tems (and what ever else ex ist in an entitary way), as points of en try to re al ity they also serve as modes of (scien tific) ex pla na tion. Of course the cos mic sys tem of the world or der com prises many more func tional modes than the five iden ti fied. With out pro vid ing an ar gu ment for iden ti fy ing and nam ing the oth ers, we sim ply enu mer ate them: only think about the sen si tive mode of feel ing, the an a lyt i cal mode of log i cal think ing, the his tor i cal mode of cul tural for ma tion (for ma tive con trol/power), the sign mode of sym bol i cal sig ni fica tion, the so cial mode of hu man in ter ac tion, the eco nomic mode of avoid ing excesses, the aes thetic mode of beau ti ful har mony, the jural mode of ret ri bu tion, the ethi cal mode of love and the fi du ciary mode of cer tainty.
Some implications of the multi-aspectual nature of reality for systems theory
The orig i nal modal spa tial "seat" of the whole-parts re la tion en tails that what ever func tions within this as pect will ex hibit fea tures true to the na ture of this as pect. Systems the ory is there fore jus ti fied in its em pha sis on the whole ness or to tal ity char ac ter of sys tems. None the less we have to point out that the le git i mate ap pli ca tion of the whole-parts re la tion does have def i nite bound aries. If it is true that all vari ants of atom ism ex panded the dis crete mean ing of num ber be yond the lim its of a jus ti fi able appli ca tion of the mean ing of dis crete ness, then the same ap plies to an un jus ti fied ex pansion of the mean ing of the spa tial whole-parts re la tion in var i ous forms of ho lism. These lim its may cau tion us to avoid the prac tice of char ac ter is ing sys tems with the aid of the qual i fi ca tion ho lis tic. Now a days it is fairly com mon place that a per son who wants to ex plain that all as pects of a sit u a tion ought to be taken into ac count will call such an ap proach ho lis tic. Rather, the term ho lism should be re served for an over es tima tion of the whole-parts re la tion, ap ply ing it be yond its le git i mate con fines. In this sense ho lism is just as one-sided and mis-directed as at om ism.
What are the lim i ta tions to the whole-parts re la tion? In or der to find an an swer to this ques tion we may con sider a few ex am ples. First of all we will look at the interlacement of phys i cal en ti ties such as at oms and mol e cules. Then we will high light the func tion of the lat ter within the small est bi oti cal unit of life, the cell. Finally, as an ex am ple of an il le git i mate ap pli ca tion of the whole-parts re la tion we will briefly pay at ten tion to the sys tems con cept as it is de vel oped in the so cio log i cal the ory of Parsons. In all these cases, as an ex pan sion of the jus ti fied in ten tions of sys tems the ory, an al ter na tive ap pli ca tion of the idea of the in ter con nec tions and intertwinement between dif fer ently na tured sys tems will be pro posed.
Limitations of the whole-parts relation
Al though we have ar gued that within the con text of the orig i nal spa tial mode of re al ity we are con fronted with the in fi nite divisibility of a spa tial whole, there are im por tant lim i ta tions to the un qual i fied use of this spa tial whole-parts re la tion. The in ter weav ing which ex ists, for ex am ple, be tween the so dium and chlo rine at oms which are found in ta ble salt, can not be ac counted for ex clu sively with the help of the whole-parts perspec tive. Ev ery di vi sion of ta ble salt must -that is if we still want to be work ing with real parts of salt -still pos sess the same chem i cal struc ture (NaCl). The crit i cal question is whether, con sid ered in sep a ra tion, so dium and chlo rine each in di vid u ally has a salt struc ture? Are so dium and chlo rine true parts of salt? The an swer is ob vi ous: No, be cause nei ther Na nor Cl as such has a NaCl-structure on its own! What is needed is a the o ret i cal ac count of the con tin ued ex is tence of the in ter nal struc ture of the Na and Cl at oms in spite of their mo lec u lar con nec tion in ta ble salt. The Dutch phi los o pher Herman Dooyeweerd pro posed to em ploy the term enkapsis to ac count for all kinds of interlacement where this is the case (cf. Dooyeweerd, 1997-III:627 ff., 694-780) . Al though a thor ough ex pla na tion of this al ter na tive the ory will be treated in a sep a rate ar ti cle, an out line of its ba sic in ten tions will be given.
Take a wa ter mol e cule as an ex am ple. With out at oms there is no mol e cule. Does this mean that the bound at oms be come in te gral parts of the mol e cule? But what about the atomic nu cleus which is not af fected by the chem i cal bond? Does this mean that the nu cleus -which is not merely an ac ci den tal char ac ter is tic of the atom but pre cisely that cen tral part which de ter mines the place of the atom within the pe ri odic ta ble -is a threat to the whole ness of the wa ter mol e cule? The the ory of enkaptic interlacements is de signed to ac count for these dif fi cult and com pli cated states of af fairs in a the o ret ically sat is fac tory way.
Von Bertalanffy's challenge to neo-Darwinism
Mod ern bi ol ogy strug gled in di verg ing ways with the re la tion be tween liv ing en ti ties and their con sti tu tive ma te rial build ing blocks (cf. Von Bertalanffy, 1952) . Is it pos sible to de scribe and char ac ter ise liv ing en ti ties ex clu sively and com pletely in terms of their con sti tu tive phys i cal-chemical com po nents? If the lat ter point of view is cor rect, then one has to ask whether the dis tinc tion be tween "life" and "death" still makes any sense. If ev ery thing is de ter mined by the in ter ac tion among life less ma te rial con stit uents, then the dif fer ence be tween be ing alive and be ing life less fades to an il lu sory periph eral phe nom e non of the phys i cal mass of re al ity.
In neo-Darwinist thought nat u ral se lec tion re ceives much prom i nence, for ex am ple in the story told about the sup posed or i gin of the first liv ing en ti ties. The as sump tion is that by means of se lec tion or ganic com bi na tions ac ci den tally emerged -amino ac ids, nu cleic acid, en zymes, etc. This pro cess, in turn, sup pos edly gave rise to the for ma tion of re pro duc tive units, vi rus-like forms, proto-organisms and even tu ally true liv ing cells. How ever, in view of phys i cal laws, Von Bertalanffy, amongst oth ers, is jus ti fied in his ques tion ing of this con struc tion:
In con trast to this it should be pointed out that se lec tion, com pe ti tion and 'survival of the fit test' al ready pre sup pose the ex is tence of self-maintaining systems; they there fore can not be the re sult of se lec tion. At pres ent we know no phys i cal law which would pre scribe that, in a 'soup' of or ganic com pounds, open sys tems, self-maintaining in a state of high est im prob a bil ity, are formed. And even if such sys tems are ac cepted as be ing 'given', there is no law in physics stat ing that their evo lu tion, on the whole, would pro ceed in the di rec tion of in creas ing or ga ni za tion, i.e. im prob a bil ity. Se lec tion of ge no types with max imum off spring helps lit tle in this re spect. It is hard to un der stand why, ow ing to dif fer en tial re pro duc tion, evo lu tion should have gone be yond rab bits, her ring or even bac te ria, which are un ri valled in their re pro duc tion rate (Von Bertalanffy, 1973:160-161) .
Those who have re spect for sci en tific mod esty may do well to re flect upon a re mark once made by Haldane in a dis cus sion with Sil ver:
I had a long con ver sa tion with J.B.S. Haldane, which started off with pol i tics and ended with sci ence. When I ques tioned him about evo lu tion, one of his remarks sparked my in ter est, and sent me to the li brary that eve ning: 'Evo lu tion's not the prob lem. Life is.' Then he said, 'Oparin and I once had an idea about that, but we'll never know the real an swer' (Sil ver, 1998:353) .
The phys i cal unique ness of the liv ing cell forms the coun ter part of its ir re duc ible biotically char ac ter ised struc ture. With re gard to the unique man ner in which the living cell func tions in the phys i cal as pect of re al ity, Karl Trincher men tions four mac roscopic char ac ter is tics (Trincher, 1985:336) . Von Bertalanffy real ised that apart from such phys i cal char ac ter is tics of liv ing en ti ties -such as be ing "open" in a ther mo dynamic sense -liv ing en ti ties are also to be viewed as or gan ised wholes or to tal i ties.
Be fore him Driesch al ready made an ef fort to come to terms with this to tal ity charac ter of liv ing en ti ties. How ever, he failed to de scribe the in flu ence of a sup pos edly im ma te rial entelechie (im ma te rial vi tal force) on the ma te rial com po nents of liv ing things oth er wise than in terms ap peal ing to the phys i cal as pect. He could not see that sci en tific con cep tuali sation nec es sar ily uti lises func tional modes of ex pla na tion (points of en try). He even pre ferred to see entelechie as a sys tem of ne ga tions which could not be de ter mined pos i tively: it is non -spatial, non-mechanical, in di vis i ble [cf. Sinnott, 1963 and Haas, 1968] and non-energetic (Driesch, 1931: 297) .
Within the con text of the or dered (cen tred) sys temic struc ture of the cell, we do how ever (from a bi oti cal per spec tive) come across the var i ous or gans (organelles) which are true parts of the liv ing cell-organism. Since the cell is built up of non-living ma te rial com po nents we can not sim ply say that these organelles are parts of the cell in its to tal ity. In or der to in di cate the bi oti cal ac tiv ity of the cell it is ap pro pri ate just to em ploy the men tioned phrase: cell-organism. The var i ous or gans of the cell are all parts of the cell or gan ism. Yet the dif fer ent organelles only ex ist on the ba sis of phys ical-chemical con sti tu tive sub stances -which once again high lights the need for a theory of struc tural interlacements which can do jus tice to the in ter weav ing of dif fer ent spheres of op er a tion (to be treated in a sep a rate ar ti cle). Instead we ter mi nate our discus sion with a brief in di ca tion of the lim i ta tions of ap ply ing the whole-parts re la tion to hu man so ci etal realtionships.
Is it possible to understand human society in terms of a whole and its parts?
The o ret i cal re flec tion on the na ture of hu man so ci ety is prac ti cally as old as phi los ophy it self. Tra di tionally it was placed within the con text of an en com pass ing the ory of the state and, par tic u larly dur ing the Mid dle ages, it was ac com pa nied by a par tic u lar view of the church. Plato, Ar is totle and Thomas of Aqui nas started from the so cial nature of be ing hu man and thought in terms of a larg est so ci etal whole (the state or the church) en com pass ing all of so ci ety. The late scho las tic nominalistic move ment, starting with John the Scott and elab o rated by Wil liam of Ockham, and in par tic u lar by Marsilius of Padua and Jean of Jandun in their writ ing in de fense of peace (Defensor Pacis), trans formed the ho lis tic mode of thought dom i nant dur ing the me di eval pe riod into its op po site, an atomistic view.
This di lemma be tween at om ism (in di vid u al ism) and ho lism (uni ver sal ism) was funda men tally chal lenged for the first time by the Ger man le gal scholar, Johannes Althusius. In a work from the year 1603 he ad dresses the ques tion of what can be consid ered to be a part of the state (a regnum). Whereas tra di tion ally it was unproblematic to in clude in this list so ci etal col lec tivi ties such as the church, the fam ily, the busi ness en ter prise, and so on, Althusius real ised that it is only prov inces which are truly parts of a state. Ev ery one of these non-state forms of so cial life is ruled ac cord ing to its own laws which are fit ting to the pe cu liar na ture of each one of them. Althusius de clares:
It can be said that in di vid ual cit i zens, fam i lies, and collegia are not mem bers of a realm (i.e. the state -DFMS), .... On the other hand, cit ies, ur ban com mu nities, and prov inces are mem bers of a realm (Althusius, 1603:16) .
With re spect to so cial forms of life dis tinct from the state Althusius holds:
Proper laws (leges propriae) are those en act ments by which par tic u lar as so ci ations are ruled. They dif fer in each spe cies of as so ci a tion ... as the na ture of each re quires (Althusius, 1965:16) . Un for tu nately Woldring does not high light this dif fer ence in prin ci ple be tween the whole-parts re la tion and the "own laws" pe cu liar to the var i ous non-political realms of life in the thought of Althusius (cf. Woldring 1998:125 ff.) . Al though Althusius formu lated his ideas within the con text of his "sym bi otic" view of so ci ety, his in sights indeed form one of the most im por tant points of con nec tion for an un der stand ing of human so ci ety tran scend ing the di lemma of in di vid u al ism and uni ver sal ism.
In con clu sion we will briefly in ves ti gate the ques tion whether the sys tems the ory of Par sons suc ceeds in giv ing an ac count of these "proper laws."
The reduction present in Parsons' LAIG scheme The pri mary cat e go ries used by Par sons in the func tional clas si fi ca tion of his so cio logi cal sys tems the ory are that of pat tern-maintenance (also des ig nated as la tency), together with in te gra tion, goal-attainment and ad ap ta tion (Par sons, 1961:30) . He declares that the "func tion of pat tern-maintenance re fers to the im per a tive of main tain ing the sta bil ity of the pat terns of in sti tu tion al ised cul ture de fin ing the struc ture of the system" (Par sons, 1961:38) and then adds the fol low ing re mark:
Pat tern-maintenance in this sense plays a part in the the ory of so cial sys tems, as of other sys tems of ac tion, com pa ra ble to that of the con cept of in er tia in mechan ics. It serves as the most fun da men tal ref er ence point to which the anal y sis of other, more vi a ble fac tors can be re lated (Par sons, 1961:39) . When Par sons and Bales for mu late a law im i tat ing New ton's first law of mo tion (ba sically Ga li leo's law of in er tia), they char ac ter ise it as be ing merely "an other way of stat ing one as pect of the fun da men tal pos tu late that we are deal ing with equilibrating sys tems" (Par sons and Bales, 1953:100 -note the in flu ence of Schumpeter). Par sons and Bales do not un der stand the dif fer ence be tween the kinematical and the phys i cal as pects. They also do not ad e quately dis tin guish be tween closed and open sys tems within the phys i cal as pect. Con se quently, they wrongly iden tify ho meo sta sis with the anal ogy of in er tia (which has an orig i nal kinematical mean ing) in their char ac teri sation of "equilibrating sys tems." The same com ment is rel e vant with re spect to Par sons' use of the con cept of pat tern-maintenance, seen by him as some thing com pa ra ble with the con cept of in er tia in me chan ics. Main te nance al ways re quires new en ergy-input (into an open sys tem) -some thing dif fer ent from the in er tial no tion of mere con tin u ation.
His animistic (Ar is to te lian) con cep tion of in er tia alerts Catton and causes him to men tion "the sub tly animistic con no ta tions of his vo cab u lary as well as the 'animistic over tones' in Par sons' use of the phrase 'pat tern-maintenance' " (Catton, 1966:82) .
Partly due to the asym me try be tween the con cepts of struc ture and func tion Par sons even tu ally pre ferred to speak about func tion al ism instead of struc tural-functionalism (cf. Par sons, 1977a:49; 100; 116) .
Our view is that the econ omy and the pol ity should be treated as func tional subsys tems within a so ci ety (Par sons, 1961:34).
The ter mi no log i cal con text of Par sons' con cept for ma tion is clear. First of all he explores the spa tial whole-parts re la tion by em ploy ing the terms sys tem and sub sys tem as well as the dis tinc tion be tween in ter nal (in side) and ex ter nal (out side). In te gra tion and pat tern-maintenance are di rected to the in side whereas ad ap ta tion and goal-attainment re lates to the out side. Pat tern-maintenance, mis taken by Par sons with an anal ogy of in er tia, ac tu ally (an a log i cally) re flects the mean ing of ther mo dy namic open sys tems, while the other three cat e go ries are all de rived from the orig i nal meaning of the bi oti cal as pect of re al ity -ad ap ta tion, in te gra tion and goal-attainment. How ever, the iden ti fi ca tion and dis tin guish ing of dif fer ent so ci etal col lec tivi ties tran scend the scope of the LAIG scheme. If the "pol ity" is char ac ter ised by (col lective) goal-attainment and the "econ omy" by ad ap ta tion, noth ing dis tinc tive is as serted. Any av er age firm has to at tain cer tain goals and any "pol ity" has to adapt to its en viron ment.
The clas si cal school in eco nomic the ory saw in the mar ket the prime man i fes ta tion of the op er a tion of the 'law' of sup ply and de mand and used the func tion ing of the mar ket to ex plain ev ery thing within eco nomic life. Both R.H. Coase (1937) and O.E. Wil liam son (1975 Wil liam son ( , 1985 start from the as sump tion that mar kets are ba sic and his tor ically orig i nal. The firm is a sec ond ary phe nom e non, emerg ing through the at tempt to ec ono mise and in ter nal ise the cost of mar ket trans ac tions be tween in di vid u als. Fourie cor rectly asks whether it is le git i mate "to at tempt to ex plain the typ i cal and dis tinguish ing in ner na ture of the firm ex clu sively in terms of an other, typ i cally dif fer ent rela tion, i.e. the mar ket (trans ac tions, con tracts) (Fourie, 1993:41) . Only when we look at the eco nomic as pect of re al ity as it guides the to tal ity struc ture of the firm do we dis cern its qual i fy ing func tion. Care fully dis tin guish ing it from the jural as pect opens room for an in sight into the equally unique struc tural prin ci ple of state. Since the economic and the jural as pects are modal func tions of re al ity in their own right, it is mistaken to try to side-step them in the char ac teri sa tion of the "econ omy" and "pol ity." The bi otic "de scent" of the terms ad ap ta tion and goal-at tain ment dis qual ify them to elu ci date what is dis tinc tive be tween the "econ omy" and the "pol ity."
Ev ery unique so ci etal whole or sys tem has its typ i cal qual i fy ing func tion, with out al low ing any one of them to em brace all the oth ers within a dif fer en ti ated so ci ety. The in ner sphere-sovereignty of each dif fer en ti ated sphere ought to be ac knowl edged without stretch ing the whole-parts re la tion be yond the con fines of any one of them.
Ac cord ing to Münch the start ing-point of the the o ret i cal de bate of the 1980s within so cio log i cal theo ris ing is "Weber's the ory of ra tion al is ation of mod ern so ci ety into spheres that are guided to an in creas ing ex tent by their own in ner laws (I am it ali cis ing -DFMS). This the ory of ra tion al is ation has been com bined -by Schluchter and Habermas -with the the ory of func tional dif fer en ti a tion as it was for mu lated by Luhmann" (1990:442) .
Conclusion
The ac knowl edge ment of the func tional di men sion of modal as pects co-conditioning the re al ity of what ever ex ists in a con crete way en ables the iden ti fi ca tion of those concep tual clus ters that are con sti tu tive in the def i ni tion of sys tems. The com plex ity of a sys tem is given in the fact that it is im pos si ble to pro vide an ex haus tive de scrip tion merely em ploy ing one modal point of en try. The at tempt to over ex tend the ex plan atory power of any sin gle mode in vari ably re sults in a reductionism, such as that of at -om ism or ho lism. Un der stand ing sys tems there fore in terms of the si mul ta neous us age of a com plex of ex plan a tory modal func tions high lights a con struc tive and pos i tive fea ture of mod ern sys tems the ory. Yet, sys tems the ory did not suf fi ciently suc ceed in lib er at ing it self from an over-extension of the spa tial whole-parts re la tion -a shortcom ing that may be rec ti fied by ex plor ing the en rich ing al ter na tive guide line of sphere-sovereignty and the the ory of enkaptic interlacements en tailed by it.
